But the pressure toward a reckless currency expansion was irresistible, and the pending bill passed. Mr. Chandler's prophecies were promptly verified, for the gold premium rose and the "shin-plaster currency" made its appearance with but little delay. Moreover, these issues only stimulated the thirst they were intended to quench, and the general inflation of prices soon again produced an apparent scarcity of currency. Early in 1863 a demand came from Mr. Chase for authority to increase the "greenback" circulation to $400,000,000. Congress granted this application, but Mr. Chandler opposed it, saying in the Senate: When the first proposition was made to issue $150,000,000 of treasury notes, I favored it; but when the proposition was made to increase that to $300,000,000, I opposed it.... I prophesied what the result of thus thrusting $300,000,000 of irredeemable paper upon an already overstocked market would be. I said it would carry up coin to an unlimited extent. The result has proved that my predictions were true. Now it is proposed to issue $400,000,000; we propose to thrust them upon an already over-supplied market.... It is our duty to protect the people, so far as in our power, from this great depreciation in the specie value of the circulating medium, and this we can only do by decreasing its volume. The general positions which he stated thus early Mr. Chandler firmly held throughout every stage of the subsequent contest over the "currency question." He believed that irredeemable paper money, although issued by the government itself and made a "legal tender" by supreme authority, was an unmixed evil; that only the most imminent peril could justify an even temporary resort to its use; that it ought never to be employed except within narrow limits; that any excessive issues, if made, should be promptly called in; that it should be made redeemable on demand in coin, "the money of the world," at the earliest possible moment; and that ultimately it should be wholly withdrawn from circulation by the issuing power. Accordingly, he opposed the propositions to still further increase (to $450,000,000) the issue of "greenbacks," supported the principle (while objecting to some of the details) of the act of April 12, 1866, ordering their steady contraction, and was opposed to the act of Feb. 4, 1868, stopping such contraction. The reduction in the volume of the "greenbacks" he believed to be an indispensable preliminary to the resumption of specie payments, saying in the Senate: "The government will never resume so long as it has $400,000,000 of outstanding demand notes." As he opposed during the war excessive issues of the "greenbacks," so after it closed he steadily favored the reduction of their volume with the view to the early restoration of their convertibility and their final redemption and canceling. The hesitating and halting policy, which perpetuated all