[Footnote 39: Aristot. Physic. iv. 10, p. 217, b. 29. [Greek: E)cho/menon de\ tô=n ei)rême/nôn e)sti\n e)pelthei=n peri\ chro/nou; prô=ton de\ kalô=s e)/chei diaporê=sai peri\ au)tou= _kai\ dia\ tô=n e)xôterikô=n lo/gôn_, po/teron tô=n o)/ntôn e)sti\n ê)\ tô=n mê\ o)/ntôn, ei)=ta ti/s ê( phu/sis au)tou=. O(/ti me\n ou)=n ê)\ o(/lôs e)/stin, ê)\ mo/lis kai\ a)mudrô=s, e)k tô=nde/ tis a)\n u(popteu/seien.] Then, after a column of text urging various [Greek: a)pori/as] as to whether Time is or is not, he goes on, p. 218, a. 31:--[Greek: Peri\ me\n ou)=n tô=n u(parcho/ntôn au)tô=| tosau=t' e)/stô diêporême/na. Ti/ d' e)sti\n o( chro/nos, kai\ ti/s au)tou= ê( phu/sis, o(moi/ôs e)/k te tô=n paradedome/nôn a)/dêlo/n e)sti, kai\ peri\ ô(=n tugcha/nomen dielêlutho/tes pro/teron]--thus taking up the questions, What Time is? What is the nature of Time? Upon this he goes through another column of [Greek: a)pori/ai], difficulties and counter-difficulties, until p. 219, a. 1, when he approaches to a positive determination, as the sequel of various negatives--[Greek: o(/ti me\n ou)=n ou)/te ki/nêsis ou)/t' a)/neu kinê/seôs o( chro/nos e)sti/, phanero/n. _lêpte/on_ de/, e)pei\ zêtou=men ti/ e)stin o( chro/nos, _e)nteu=then a)rchome/nois_, ti/ tê=s kinê/seô/s e)stin.] He pursues this positive determination throughout two farther columns (see [Greek: u(pokei/sthô], a. 30), until at length he arrives at his final definition of Time--[Greek: a)rithmo\s kinê/seôs kata\ to\ pro/teron kai\ u(/steron, kai\ sunechê/s (sunechou=s ga\r)]--which he declares to be [Greek: phanero/n], p. 220, a. 25. It is plain that the phrase [Greek: e)xôterikoi\ lo/goi] here designates the preliminary dialectic tentative process, before the final affirmative is directly attempted, as we read in De Gener. et Corr. i. 3, p. 317, b. 13: [Greek: peri\ me\n ou)=n tou/tôn e)n a)/llois _te diêpo/rêtai kai\ diô/ristai_ toi=s lo/gois e)pi\ plei=on]--first, [Greek: to\ _diaporei=n_], next, [Greek: to\ _diori/zein_].]