The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle — Aristotle — John Shaqi
The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
Aristotle · en
It is truly absurd for a man to attribute his actions to external
things instead of to his own capacity for being easily caught by
them;[1] or, again, to ascribe the honourable to himself, and the base
ones to pleasure.
So then that seems to be compulsory “whose origination is from without,
the party compelled contributing nothing.”
Chapter II.
Now every action of which ignorance is the cause is not-voluntary, but
that only is involuntary which is attended with pain and remorse; for
clearly the man who has done anything by reason of ignorance, but is
not annoyed at his own action, cannot be said to have done it _with_
his will because he did not know he was doing it, nor again _against_
his will because he is not sorry for it.
So then of the class “acting by reason of ignorance,” he who feels
regret afterwards is thought to be an involuntary agent, and him that
has no such feeling, since he certainly is different from the other, we
will call a not-voluntary agent; for as there is a real difference it
is better to have a proper name.
Again, there seems to be a difference between acting _because of_
ignorance and acting _with_ ignorance: for instance, we do not usually
assign ignorance as the cause of the actions of the drunken or angry
man, but either the drunkenness or the anger, yet they act not
knowingly but with ignorance.
Again, every bad man is ignorant what he ought to do and what to leave
undone, and by reason of such error men become unjust and wholly evil.
Again, we do not usually apply the term involuntary when a man is
ignorant of his own true interest;[2] because ignorance which affects
moral choice[3] constitutes depravity but not involuntariness: nor does
any ignorance of principle (because for this men are blamed) but
ignorance in particular details, wherein consists the action and
wherewith it is concerned, for in these there is both compassion and
allowance, because he who acts in ignorance of any of them acts in a
proper sense involuntarily.
It may be as well, therefore, to define these particular details; what
they are, and how many; viz. who acts, what he is doing, with respect
to what or in what, sometimes with what, as with what instrument, and
with what result;[4] as that of preservation, for instance, and how, as
whether softly or violently.