Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
The history of the other Sciences, of culture and above all the history
of art and of religion are, partly in regard to the elements contained
in them, and partly to their particular objects, related to the history
of Philosophy. It is through this relationship that the treatment
of the history of Philosophy has been so confused. If it is to
concern itself with the possession of culture generally and then with
scientific culture, and then again with popular myths and the dogmas
contained only in them, and yet farther with the religious reflections
which are already thoughts of a speculative kind, and which make their
appearance in them, no bounds are left to Philosophy at all. This is
so, partly on account of the amount of material itself and the labour
required in working it up and preparing it, and partly because it is in
immediate connection with so much else. But the separation must not be
made arbitrarily or as by chance, but must be derived from fundamental
determinations. If we merely look at the name of Philosophy, all this
matter will pertain to its history.
I shall speak of this material from three points of view, for three
related aspects are to be eliminated and separated from Philosophy. The
first of these is that which is generally considered to be the domain
of science, and in which are found the beginnings of understanding
thought. The second region is that of mythology and religion; the
relation of Philosophy to them seems often to be inimical both in
the time of the Greeks and of the Christians. The third is that of
philosophizing and the metaphysics of the understanding. While we
distinguish what is related to Philosophy, we must also take note of
the elements in this related matter which belong to the Notion of
Philosophy, but which appear to us to be partially separated from it:
and thus we may become acquainted with the Notion of Philosophy.
a. _Relation of Philosophy to Scientific Knowledge._
Knowledge and thought certainly form the element of whatever has to do
with particular sciences as they form the element of Philosophy; but
their subjects are mainly finite subjects and appearance. A collection
of facts known about this content is by its nature excluded from
Philosophy: neither this content nor such a form has anything to do
with it. But even if the sciences are systematic and contain universal
principles and laws from which they proceed, they are still related to
a limited circle of objects. The ultimate principles are assumed as are
the objects themselves; that is, the outward experience or the feelings
of the heart, natural or educated sense of right and duty, constitute
the source from which they are created. Logic and the determinations
and principles of thought in general are in their methods assumed.