Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
the immediate essence of these immediately objective things were
indicated, and as if this doctrine of real essence or ontology were
distinguished from the knowledge of God, or theology. These simple
realities and their relation and movement seem only to express moments
of the objective and not mind, because there is lacking in them one
element—that is to say, reflection into themselves—which we demand
for the existence of the divine essence. For mind, the truly absolute
essence, is not only the simple and immediate, but that which reflects
itself into itself, for which in its opposition the unity of itself
and of that which is opposed is; but these moments and their movement
do not present it as such, for they make their appearance as simple
abstractions. On the other hand, they may also be taken to be pure
Notions, which pertain purely to reflection into itself. In this case
Being is wanting to them, or what we likewise demand for reflection
into itself as essential to the divine essence; and then their movement
is esteemed an empty round of empty abstractions, which belong only to
reflection and have no reality. For the solution of this contradiction
we must know the nature of apprehension and knowledge, in order to
obtain in the Notion everything there present. Thus shall we have the
consciousness that the Notion is in truth neither the immediate only,
although it is the simple, nor merely that which reflects itself into
itself, the thing of consciousness; for it is of spiritual simplicity,
thus really existent—as it is thought turned back on itself, so it is
also Being in itself, _i.e._ objective Being, and consequently all
reality. Plato did not state this knowledge of the nature of the Notion
so expressly, nor did he say that this essential Being of things is the
same as the divine essence. But really it is simply not put into words,
for the fact is undoubtedly present, and the only distinction is one of
speech as between the mode of the ordinary conception and that of the
Notion. On the one hand, this reflection into itself, the spiritual,
the Notion, is present in the speculation of Plato; for the unity of
the one and many, &c., is just this individuality in difference, this
being-turned-back-within-itself in its opposite, this opposite which is
implicit; the essential reality of the world is really this movement
returning into itself of that which is turned back within itself. But,
on the other hand, for this very reason, this being reflected into
self—like the God of ordinary conception—still remains with Plato
something separated; and in his representation of the Becoming of
Nature in the Timæus, God, and the essential reality of things, appear
as distinguished.