Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3) — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
These are the main facts as regards externality in religion itself, on
which all further determinations depend.
3. We have now obtained a better idea of the elements present in this
philosophy; but in barbaric nations Christianity could have this form
of externality alone, and this pertains to history. For the dulness
and frightful barbarism of such nations must be met by servitude, and
through this service must their education be accomplished. Man serves
under this yoke; this fearful discipline had to be gone through if the
Teutonic nations were to be raised into spiritual life. But this severe
and wearisome service has an end, an object; infinite spring and infinite
elasticity, the freedom of spirit, is the prize. The Indians are in equal
servitude, but they are irrevocably lost—identified and identical with
nature, yet in themselves opposed to nature. Knowledge is thus limited
to the Church, but in this very knowledge a positive authority is firmly
rooted, and it is a prominent feature of this philosophy, whose first
quality is consequently that of lack of freedom. Thought thus does not
appear as though it proceeded from itself and was grounded in itself, but
as being really independent of self and depending on a given content, the
doctrine of the Church—which, although speculative itself, also contains
the mode of the immediate existence of external objects.
In theological form it may be said that, in general, the Middle Ages
signify the dominion of the Son and not of Spirit; for this last is still
in the possession of the priesthood. The Son has differentiated Himself
from the Father, and is regarded as remaining in this differentiation,
so that the Father in Him is only implicit; but in the unity of both we
first reach Spirit, the Son as Love. If we remain a moment too long in
the difference without likewise asserting the identity, the Son is the
Other; and in this we find the Middle Ages defined and characterized. The
character of Philosophy in the Middle Ages is thus in the second place
an attempt to think, to conceive, to philosophize under the burden of
absolute hypotheses; for it is not the thinking Idea in its freedom, but
set forth in the form of an externality. We thus find here in Philosophy
the same character as is present in the general condition of things,
and for this reason I before called to mind the concrete character that
prevails; for on every period of time one special characteristic is
always imprinted. The philosophy of the Middle Ages thus contains the
Christian principle, which is the highest incentive to thought, because
the Ideas therein present are thoroughly speculative. Of this one side is
that the Idea is grasped by the heart, if we call the individual man the
heart. The identity of the immediate individuality with the Idea rests
in this, that the Son, the mediator, is known as _this_ man; this is the
identity of spirit with God for the heart as such. But the connection