The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
only does it forsake it in its immediate singularity, but it actually
transforms it within the region of idea[68], converting a concrete
object of sense into an abstract subject-matter of thought, that is
converting it into something other than the same object of its sensuous
perception actually was. The artistic interest does not follow such
a process, and is distinct from that of science for this reason.
The contemplation of art restricts its interest simply in the way
in which the work of art, as external object, in the directness of
its definition, and in the singularity wherein it appears to sense,
is manifested in all its features of colour, form, and sound, or as
a single isolated vision of the whole; it does not go so far beyond
the immediately received objective character as to propose, as is the
case with science, the ideal or conceptive thinking of this particular
objectivity under the terms of the rational and universal notion which
underlies it.
The interest of art, therefore, is distinguishable from the practical
interest of desire in virtue of the fact that it suffers its object to
remain in its free independence, whereas desire applies it, even to the
point of destruction, to its own uses. The contemplation of art, on
the other hand, differs from that of a scientific intelligence in an
analogous way[69] in virtue of the fact that it cherishes an interest
for the object in its isolated existence, and is not concerned to
transform the same into terms of universal thought and notion.