The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 3 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 3 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
(_b_) In the _second_ place we may seek for our present use a more
definite point of transition from the architecture of independent
type in those constructions which have been raised as _housings of
the dead_, partly in the form of excavations beneath the ground, and
partly as buildings above it. More particularly among the Egyptians
this kind of construction, whether subterranean or super-terranean,
was associated with a realm of the dead, just as in general among the
Egyptians it is a realm of the invisible which in the first instance
receives a habitation and is placed before us. The Hindoo burns his
dead, or suffers their bones to lie and moulder on the earth. According
to the Hindoo's point of view mankind are, or become, god or gods,
whichever way one cares to put it, and we are unable to find in
their case this assured distinction between the living and the dead
regarded as dead. Hindoo constructions, consequently, so far as they
do not originate in Mohammedanism, are not dwellings for the dead,
and appear generally to belong to an earlier period as we assumed
was true of the astonishing excavations described. In the case of
the Egyptians, however, the contrast between living and dead asserts
itself predominantly. That which is spiritual begins to separate itself
essentially from what is material. We have here the resurrection of
spirit in concrete individuality, the movement of that process. The
dead are therefore retained fast as personality[57], and are secured
and preserved securely above the conception of dissolution into Nature,
that is into universal evanescence, flood and extinction. Singularity
is the principle of the spiritual in its notion of independence,
because spirit is only able to exist as individuality, that is
personality. Consequently this honour paid to and preservation of the
dead can only appear to ourselves as a first and important element in
the definition of the existence of spiritual individuality, since
it is here that singularity is asserted as maintained rather than
abandoned, inasmuch as the body at any rate is treasured and respected
as this Nature's own mode of individuality. Herodotus assures us, a
fact we have already noticed, that the Egyptians were the first to
declare that the souls of men were immortal, and despite the fact that
the grasp on spiritual individuality is in their case very incomplete,
in so far as in their view the deceased must for three thousand years
pass through a whole series of animals belonging to land, water, and
air, yet for all that in this conception, and in the embalming of the
body, we find fixedly the notion of bodily individuality, and of the
independent self-existence as separate from that body.