The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 4 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 4 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
all that not the freedom or lack of it in their souls and intelligence,
in other words the vital manifestation of their personality, but the
accomplished end, and its result as operative upon the actual world
already there, and essentially independent of such individuality, which
constitutes the object of history. And, moreover, from a further point
of view we find manifested in the historical condition the play of
contingency, that breach between what is implicitly substantive and
the relativity of particular events and occurrences, no less than of
the specific subjectivity of characters displayed in their personal
passions, opinions and fortunes, which in this prosaic mode of life
present far more eccentricity and variation than do the wonders of
poetry, which through all diversity must remain constant to what is
valid in all times and places.
And _finally_, in respect to the actual execution of affairs within
the cognisance of history we find here again the introduction of
a prosaic element, if we contrast it with the impulse of genuine
poetry, partly in the division asserted by personal idiosyncracy
from a consciousness of laws, principles, maxims and so forth, which
is thereby necessarily absorbed in the universal condition or fact;
and in part also the realization of the ends proposed involve much
preparation and arrangement, the means to effect which extend far,
and embrace many necessary or subservient relations, which have to be
readjusted and adapted, in order to carry out the course proposed,
with intelligence, prudence and prosaic circumspection. The work in
short cannot be undertaken offhand, but only to a large extent after
extensive introduction. The result of this is that the particular acts
of execution, which, it is here assumed, come into effect for the _one_
main purpose, are often either wholly contingent in respect to their
content, and remain without ideal union, or are asserted under the
form of a practical utility regulated by a mind dominated by the aims
proposed; in other words, they do not proceed unmediated from the core
of free and independent life itself.[11]