20. Forasmuch as the supreme command is constituted by virtue of the compacts which each single citizen or subject mutually makes with the other; but all contracts, as they receive their force from the contractors, so by their consent they lose it again and are broken: perhaps some may infer hence, that by the consent of all the subjects together the supreme authority may be wholly taken away. Which inference, if it were true, I cannot discern what danger would thence by right arise to the supreme commanders. For since it is supposed that each one hath obliged himself to each other; if any one of them shall refuse, whatsoever the rest shall agree to do, he is bound notwithstanding. Neither can any man without injury to me, do that which by contract made with me he hath obliged himself not to do. But it is not to be imagined that ever it will happen, that all the subjects together, not so much as one excepted, will combine against the supreme power. Wherefore there is no fear for rulers in chief, that by any right they can be despoiled of their authority. If, notwithstanding, it were granted that their right depended only on that contract which each man makes with his fellow-citizen, it might very easily happen that they might be robbed of that dominion under pretence of right. For subjects being called either by the command of the city, or seditiously flocking together, most men think that the consents of all are contained in the votes of the greater part; which in truth is false. For it is not from nature that the consent of the major part should be received for the consent of all, neither is it true in tumults; but it proceeds from civil institution: and is then only true, when that man or court which hath the supreme power, assembling his subjects, by reason of the greatness of their number allows those that are elected a power of speaking for those who elected them; and will have the major part of voices, in such matters as are by him propounded to be discussed, to be as effectual as the whole. But we cannot imagine that he who is chief, ever convened his subjects with intention that they should dispute his right; unless weary of the burthen of his charge, he declared in plain terms that he renounces and abandons his government. Now, because most men through ignorance esteem not the consent of the major part of citizens only, but even of a very few, provided they be of their opinion, for the consent of the whole city; it may very well seem to them, that the supreme authority may by right be abrogated, so it be done in some great assembly of citizens by the votes of the greater number. But though a government be constituted by the contracts of particular men with particulars, yet its right depends not on that obligation only; there is another tie also towards him who commands. For each citizen compacting with his fellow, says thus: _I convey my right on this party, upon condition that you pass yours to the same_: by which means, that