5. There be two sorts of lots; one arbitrary, made by men, and commonly known by the names of _lot_, _chance_, _hazard_, and the like; and there is _natural lot_, such as is _primogeniture_, which is no more but the chance, or lot, of being first born, which it seemeth they considered, that call inheritance by the name of κληρονομία, which signifieth _distribution_ by lot. Secondly, _prima occupatio_, first seizing, or finding of a thing, whereof no man made use before, which for the most part also is merely _chance_. [Sidenote: That men submit to arbitration.] 6. Although men agree upon these laws of nature, and endeavour to observe the same; yet considering the passions of men, that make it difficult to understand by what actions, and circumstances of actions, those laws are broken, there must needs arise many great controversies about the interpretation thereof, by which the peace must needs be dissolved, and men return again to their former estate of hostility. For the taking away of which controversies, it is necessary that there be some common _arbitrator_ and _judge_, to whose sentence both the parties in the controversies ought to stand. And therefore it is a law of nature, _That in every controversy, the parties thereto ought mutually to agree upon an arbitrator, whom they both trust; and mutually to covenant to stand to the sentence he shall give therein_. For where every man is his own _judge_, there properly is no judge at all; as where every man carveth out his own right, it hath the same effect, as if there were no right at all: and where is no judge, there is no end of controversy: and therefore the right of hostility remaineth. [Sidenote: Of an arbitrator.] 7. An _arbitrator_ therefore, or he that is judge, is trusted by the parties to any controversy, to determine the same by the declaration of his own judgment therein. Out of which followeth first, that the judge ought not to be concerned in the controversy he endeth; for in that case he is a party, and ought by the same reason to be judged by another. Secondly, that he maketh no covenant with either of the parties, to pronounce sentence for the one, more than for the other. Nor doth he covenant so much, as that his sentence shall be just; for that were to make the parties judges of the sentence, whereby the controversy would remain still undecided. Nevertheless for the trust reposed in him, and for the equality which the law of nature requireth him to consider in the parties, he violateth that law, if for favour, or hatred to either party, he give other sentence than he thinketh right. And thirdly, that no man ought to make himself judge in any controversy between others, unless they consent and agree thereto. [Sidenote: That no man press his counsel upon any man against his will.]