Here begins his reply. From which if we take these words; “knowledge of approbation;” “practical knowledge;” “heavenly bodies act upon sublunary things, not only by their motion, but also by an occult virtue, which we call influence;” “moral efficacy;” “general influence;” “special influence;” “infuse something into the will;” “the will is moved;” “the will is induced to will;” “the will suspends its own act;” which are all nonsense, unworthy of a man, nay, and if a beast could speak, unworthy of a beast, and can befal no creature whose nature is not depraved by doctrine; nothing at all remaineth to be answered. Perhaps the word, _occult virtue_, is not to be taxed as unintelligible. But then I may tax therein the want of ingenuity in him that had rather say, that heavenly bodies _do work by an occult virtue_, than that they _work he knoweth not how_; which he would not confess, but endeavours to make _occult_ be taken for a _cause_. The rest of this reply is one of those consequences, which I have answered in the beginning, where I compare the inconveniences of both opinions, that is, “that either Adam did not sin, or his sin proceeded necessarily from God;” which is no stronger a consequence than if out of this, “that a man is lame necessarily,” one should infer, that _either he is not lame_, or that _his lameness proceeded necessarily from the will of God_. To the end of this number there is nothing more of argument. The place is filled up with wondering and railing. NO. XII. [Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] _J. D._ “Fifthly, if there be no liberty, there shall be no day of doom, no last judgment, no rewards nor punishments after death. A man can never make himself a criminal, if he be not left at liberty to commit a crime. No man can be justly punished for doing that which was not in his power to shun. To take away liberty hazards heaven, but undoubtedly it leaves no hell.” _T. H._ The arguments of greatest consequence are the third and fifth, and fall both into one: namely, if there be a necessity of all events, that it will follow that praise and reprehension, reward and punishment, are all vain and unjust: and that if God should openly forbid, and secretly necessitate the same action, punishing men for what they could not avoid, there would be no belief among them of heaven or hell.