The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 05 (of 11)
Thomas Hobbes · en
“Thirdly, though I confess that human pacts are not the measure of God’s
justice, but his justice is his own immutable will, whereby he is ready
to give every man that which is his own, as rewards to the good,
punishments to the bad; so nevertheless God may oblige himself freely to
his creature. He made the covenant of works with mankind in Adam; and
therefore he punisheth not man contrary to his own covenant, but for the
transgression of his duty. And divine justice is not measured by
omnipotence or by irresistible power, but by God’s will. God can do many
things according to his absolute power, which he doth not. He could
raise up children to Abraham of stones, but he never did so. It is a
rule in theology, that God cannot do anything which argues any
wickedness or imperfection: as God cannot deny himself (2 Timothy ii.
13); he cannot lie (Titus i. 2). These and the like are the fruits of
impotence, not of power. So God cannot destroy the righteous with the
wicked (Genesis xviii. 25.) He could not destroy Sodom whilst Lot was in
it, (Genesis xix. 22); not for want of dominion or power, but because it
was not agreeable to his justice, nor to that law which himself had
constituted. The apostle saith (Hebrews vi. 10), _God is not unrighteous
to forget your work_. As it is a good consequence to say, this is from
God, therefore it is righteous; so is this also, this thing is
unrighteous, therefore it cannot proceed from God. We see how all
creatures by instinct of nature do love their young, as the hen her
chickens; how they will expose themselves to death for them. And yet all
these are but shadows of that love which is in God towards his
creatures. How impious is it then to conceive, that God did create so
many millions of souls to be tormented eternally in hell, without any
fault of theirs except such as he himself did necessitate them unto,
merely to shew his dominion, and because his power is irresistible? The
same privilege which T. H. appropriates here to power absolutely
irresistible, a friend of his, in his book _De Cive_, cap. VI., ascribes
to power respectively irresistible, or to sovereign magistrates, whose
power he makes to be as absolute as a man’s power is over himself; not
to be limited by any thing, but only by their strength. The greatest
propugners of sovereign power think it enough for princes to challenge
an immunity from coercive power, but acknowledge that the law hath a
directive power over them. But T. H. will have no limits but their
strength. Whatsoever they do by power, they do justly.