The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 06 (of 11)
Thomas Hobbes · en
_P._ Why not? For I think that in this very difference between the
rational faculties of particular men, lieth the true and perfect reason
that maketh every punishment certain. For, but give the authority of
defining punishments to any man whatsoever, and let that man define
them, and right reason has defined them, suppose the definition be both
made, and made known before the offence committed. For such authority is
to trump in card playing, save that in matter of government, when
nothing else is turned up, clubs are trumps. Therefore seeing every man
knoweth by his own reason what actions are against the law of reason,
and knoweth what punishments are by this authority for every evil action
ordained; it is manifest reason, that for breaking the known laws he
should suffer the known punishments. Now the person to whom this
authority of defining punishments is given, can be no other, in any
place of the world, but the same person that hath the sovereign power,
be it one man or one assembly of men. For it were in vain to give it to
any person that had not the power of the militia to cause it to be
executed; for no less power can do it, when many offenders be united and
combined to defend one another. There was a case put to King David by
Nathan, of a rich man that had many sheep, and of a poor man that had
but one, which was a tame lamb: the rich man had a stranger in his
house, for whose entertainment, to spare his own sheep he took away the
poor man’s lamb. Upon this case the King gave judgment, “Surely the man
that hath done this shall die.” What think you of this? Was it a royal,
or tyrannical judgment?
_L._ I will not contradict the canons of the Church of England, which
acknowledge the King of England within his own dominions hath the same
rights, which the good Kings of Israel had in theirs; nor deny King
David to have been one of those good Kings. But to punish with death
without a precedent law, will seem but a harsh proceeding with us, who
unwillingly hear of arbitrary laws, much less of arbitrary punishments,
unless we were sure that all our Kings would be as good as David. I will
only ask you, by what authority the clergy may take upon them to
determine or make a canon concerning the power of their own King, or to
distinguish between the right of a good and an evil King.