_L._ But if the King shall grant pardons of murder and felony of his own head, there would be very little safety for any man, either out of his house or in it, either by night or by day. And for that very cause there have been many good statutes provided, which forbid the justices to allow of such pardons as do not specially name the crime. _P._ Those statutes, I confess, are reasonable, and very profitable, which forbid the judge to pardon murders. But what statute is there that forbids the King to do it? There is a statute of 13 _Rich. II_, _c._ 1, wherein the King promiseth not to pardon murder; but there is in it a clause for the saving of the King’s regality. From which may be inferred that the King did not grant away that power, when he thought good to use it for the commonwealth. Such statutes are not laws to the King, but to his judges, and though the judges be commanded by the King not to allow pardons in many cases, yet if the King by writing command the judges to allow them, they ought to do it. I think, if the King think in his conscience it be for the good of the commonwealth, he sinneth not in it: but I hold not that the King may pardon him without sin, if any other man be damnified by the crime committed, unless he cause reparation to be made as far as the party offending can do it. And howsoever, be it sin or not sin, there is no power in England that may resist him or speak evil of him lawfully. _L._ Sir Edward Coke denies not that; and upon that ground it is that the King, he says, may pardon high-treason; for there can be no high-treason but against the King. _P._ That is well; therefore he confesseth, that whatsoever the offence be, the King may pardon so much of it as is an injury to himself, and that by his own right, without breach of any law positive or natural, or of any grant, if his conscience tell him that it be not to the damage of the commonwealth; and you know that to judge of what is good or evil to the commonwealth, belongeth to the King only. Now tell me, what it is which is said to be pardoned? _L._ What can it be, but only the offence? If a man hath done a murder, and be pardoned for the same, is it not the murder that is pardoned? _P._ Nay, by your favour, if a man be pardoned for murder or any other offence, it is the man that is pardoned; the murder still remains murder. But what is pardon? _L._ Pardon, as Sir Edward Coke says, (3 _Inst._ _p._ 233), is derived of _per_ and _dono_, and signifies thoroughly to remit. _P._ If the King remit the murder, and pardon not the man that did it, what does the remission serve for? _L._ You know well enough that when we say a murder, or any thing else, is pardoned, all Englishmen understand thereby, that the punishment due to the offence is the thing remitted.