A Treatise of Human Nature — David Hume — John Shaqi
A Treatise of Human Nature
David Hume · en
In sympathy there is an evident conversion of an idea into an
impression. This conversion arises from the relation of objects to
ourself. Ourself is always intimately present to us. Let us compare
all these circumstances, and we shall find, that sympathy is exactly
correspondent to the operations of our understanding; and even contains
something more surprizing and extraordinary.
It is now time to turn our view from the general consideration of
sympathy, to its influence on pride and humility, when these passions
arise from praise and blame, from reputation and infamy. We may
observe, that no person is ever praised by another for any quality,
which would not, if real, produce, of itself, a pride in the person
possest of it. The elogiums either turn upon his power, or riches, or
family, or virtue; all of which are subjects of vanity, that we have
already explained and accounted for. It is certain, then, that if a
person considered himself in the same light, in which he appears to his
admirer, he would first receive a separate pleasure, and afterwards a
pride or self-satisfaction, according to the hypothesis above
explained. Now nothing is more natural than for us to embrace the
opinions of others in this particular; both from sympathy, which
renders all their sentiments intimately present to us; and from
reasoning, which makes us regard their judgment, as a kind of argument
for what they affirm. These two principles of authority and sympathy
influence almost all our opinions; but must have a peculiar influence,
when we judge of our own worth and character. Such judgments are always
attended with passion;[7] and nothing tends more to disturb our
understanding, and precipitate us into any opinions, however
unreasonable, than their connexion with passion; which diffuses itself
over the imagination, and gives an additional force to every related
idea. To which we may add, that being conscious of great partiality in
our own favour, we are peculiarly pleased with any thing, that confirms
the good opinion we have of ourselves, and are easily shocked with
whatever opposes it.
[7] Book I, Part III. Sect. 10.
All this appears very probable in theory; but in order to bestow a
full certainty on this reasoning, we must examine the phaenonena of the
passions, and see if they agree with it.