of designation, [1] are not only all declared inseparable from body, but are involved in it under a further modification as ‘_qualities of its solid parts_’ _i.e._, of parts so related to each other that each will change its place sooner than admit another into it. (Book II. chap. iv. sec. 2, and chap. viii. sec. 23.) Yet, though body is thus a complex of relations--all, according to Locke’s doctrine of relation, inventions of the mind--and though it must be proportionately remote from the simple idea which ‘comes first into the mind,’ yet, on the other hand, it is in body, as an object previously given, that these relations are said to be found, and found by the senses. (Book II. chap. xiii. secs. 2, 27.) [2] [1] In the enumeration of primary qualities, ‘capacity’ is represented by ‘bulk,’ ‘place’ by ‘situation.’ [2] In the second of the passages referred to, it will be seen that ‘matter’ is used interchangeably with ‘body.’ Body is the complex in which they are found. Do we derive the idea of body from primary qualities, or the primary qualities from idea of body? 111. It will readily be seen that ‘body’ here is a mode of the idea of substance, and, like it, [1] appears in two inconsistent positions as at once the beginning and the end of the process of knowledge--as on the one hand that in which ideas are found and from which they are abstracted, and on the other hand that which results from their complication. As the attempt either to treat particular qualities as given and substance as an abstraction gradually made, or conversely to treat the ‘thing’ as given, and relations as gradually superinduced, necessarily fails for the simple reason that substance and relations each presuppose the other, so body presupposes the primary qualities as so many relations which form its essence or make it what it is, while these again presuppose body as the matter which they determine, It is because Locke substitutes for this intellectual order of mutual presupposition a succession of sensations in time, that he finds himself in the confusion we have noticed--now giving the priority to sensations in which the idea of body is supposed to be conveyed, and from it deriving the ideas of the primary qualities, now giving it to these ideas themselves, and deriving the idea of body from their complication. This is just such a contradiction as it would be to put to-day before yesterday. _We_ may escape it by the consideration that in the case before us it is not a succession of sensations in time that we have to do with at all; that ‘the real’ is an intellectual order, or mind, in which every element, being correlative to every other, at once presupposes and is presupposed by every other; but that this order communicates itself to us piecemeal, in a process of which the first condition on our part is the conception that there _is_ an order, or something related to something else; and that thus the conception of qualified