An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding — David Hume — John Shaqi
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
David Hume · en
In single instances we only see sequence of loose events which are
conjoined and never connected, 58;
the idea of necessary connexion only arises from a number of similar
instances, and the only difference between such a number and
a single instance is that the former produces a habit of
expecting the usual attendant, 59, 61.
This customary transition is the impression from which we form the
idea of necessary connexion.
E. _Reasoning from effect to cause and conversely_, 105-115 (v.
_Providence_).
In arguing from effect to cause we must not infer more qualities in
the cause than are required to produce the effect, nor reason
backwards from an inferred cause to new effects, 105-8;
we can reason back from cause to new effects in the case of human
acts by analogy which rests on previous knowledge, 111-2;
when the effect is entirely singular and does not belong to any
species we cannot infer its cause at all, 115.
F. _Definitions of Cause_, 60 (cf. 74 n).
Ceremonies
41.
Chance
ignorance of causes, 46;
has no existence, 74 (v. _Cause_ B).
Cicero
4.
Circle
in reasoning, 30.
Clarke
37 n.
Colour
peculiarity of ideas of, 16.
Contiguity
19, 42.
Contradiction
the test of demonstration, 132.
Contrariety
19 n.
Contrary
of matter of fact always possible, 21, 132.
Creation
132 n.
Criticism
132.
Cudworth
57 n, 158 n.
Custom
when strongest conceals itself, 24;
an ultimate principle of all conclusions from experience, 36, 127;
and belief, 39-45;
gives rise to inferences of animals, 84.
Definition
only applicable to complex ideas, 49;
need of, 131;
of cause, 60.
Demonstrative
opp. intuitive, 20;
reasoning, 30;
confined to quantity and number, 131;
impossible to demonstrate a fact since no negation of a fact can
involve a contradiction, 132.
Descartes
57 n.;
his universal doubt antecedent to study if strictly taken is
incurable, since even from an indubitable first principle no
advance can be made except by the faculties which we doubt,
116;
his appeal to the veracity of God is useless, 120 (v. _Scepticism_,
116-132).
Design
argument from, 105 f. (v. _Providence_).
Divisibility
of mathematical and physical points, 124.
Doubt
Cartesian, 116, 120 (v. _Scepticism_ A).
Epictetus
34.
Epicurean
philosophy, defence of, 102-15;
denial of providence and future state is harmless, 104 (v.
_Providence_).
Euclid
truths in, do not depend on existence of circles or triangles, 20.
Evidence
moral and natural, 70;
value of human, 82-9 (v. _Miracles_).
Evil
doctrine of necessity either makes God the cause of evil or denies
existence of evil as regards the whole, 78-81.
Existence
external and perception, 118-9 (v. _Scepticism_, B, 116-32).
Ex nihilo nihil
132 n.