An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding — David Hume — John Shaqi
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
David Hume · English
Experience enables us to ascribe a more than arbitrary connexion to
objects, 35;
we are determined to this by custom or habit which is the great guide
of human life, 36;
but our inference must be based on some fact present to the senses
or memory, 37;
the customary conjunction between such an object and some other
object produces an operation of the soul which is as
unavoidable as love, 38;
animals also infer one event from another by custom, 82-84;
and in man as in animals experimental reasoning depends on a species
of instinct or mechanical power that acts in us unknown to
ourselves, 85.
C. _Belief_, 39-45.
Belief differs from fiction or the loose reveries of the fancy by
some feeling annexed to it, 39;
belief cannot be defined, but may be described as a more lively,
forcible, firm, steady conception of an object than can be
attained by the imagination alone, 40;
it is produced by the principles of association, viz. resemblance,
41;
contiguity, 42;
causation, 43;
by a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature
and our ideas, 44;
this operation of our minds necessary to our subsistence and so
entrusted by nature to instinct rather than to reasoning, 45.
_Probability_, 46-7.
Belief produced by a majority of chances by an inexplicable
contrivance of Nature, 46 (cf. 87-8);
probability of causes: the failure of a cause ascribed to a secret
counteracting cause, 47 (cf. 67);
it is universally allowed that chance when strictly examined is a
mere negative word, 74.
D. _Power_, 49-57.
Power, force, energy, necessary connexion must either be defined by
analysis or explained by production of the impression from
which they are copied, 49;
from the first appearance of an object we cannot foretell its effect:
we cannot see the power of a single body: we only see
sequence, 50.
Is the idea of power derived from an internal impression and is it an
idea of reflection? 51;
it is not derived, as Locke said, from reasoning about power of
production in nature, 50 n;
nor from consciousness of influence of will over bodily organs, 52;
nor from effort to overcome resistance, 52 n (cf. 60 n);
nor from influence of will over mind, 53;
many philosophers appeal to an invisible intelligent principle, to a
volition of the supreme being, and regard causes as only
occasions and our mental conceptions as revelations, 54-5;
thus diminishing the grandeur of God, 56;
this theory too bold and beyond verification by our faculties, and
is no explanation, 57;
vis inertiae, 57 n.