Hume's Political Discourses — David Hume — John Shaqi
Hume's Political Discourses
David Hume · en
[33] I have heard it has been computed that all the creditors of the
public, natives and foreigners, amount only to 17,000. These make a
figure at present on their income; but in case of a public bankruptcy
would in an instant become the lowest, as well as the most wretched of
the people. The dignity and authority of the landed gentry and nobility
is much better rooted, and would render the contention very unequal,
if ever we come to that extremity. One would incline to assign to this
event a very near period, such as half a century, had not our fathers’
prophecies of this kind been already found fallacious by the duration
of our public credit so much beyond all reasonable expectation. When
the astrologers in France were every year foretelling the death of
Henry IV., “These fellows,” says he, “must be right at last.” We shall
therefore be more cautious than to assign any precise date, and shall
content ourselves with pointing out the event in general.
OF SOME REMARKABLE CUSTOMS.
I shall observe three remarkable customs in three celebrated
governments, and shall conclude from the whole that all general maxims
in politics ought to be established with great reserve, and that
irregular and extraordinary appearances are frequently discovered
in the moral as well as in the physical world. The former
perhaps can we better account for after they happen, from springs and
principles of which every one has within himself, or from obvious
observation, the strongest assurance and conviction; but it is often
fully as impossible for human prudence beforehand to foresee and
foretell them.
I. One would think it essential to every supreme council or assembly
which debates, that entire liberty of speech should be granted to
every member, and that all motions or reasonings should be received
which can any way tend to illustrate the point under deliberation.
One would conclude, with still greater assurance, that after a motion
was made, which was voted and approved by that assembly in which the
legislative power is lodged, the member who made the motion must for
ever be exempted from further trial or inquiry. But no political maxim
can at first sight appear more undisputable than that he must at least
be secured from all inferior jurisdiction, and that nothing less than
the same supreme legislative assembly, in their subsequent meetings,
could render him accountable for those motions and harangues which they
had before approved of. But these axioms, however irrefragable they may
appear, have all failed in the Athenian government, from causes, and
principles too, which appear almost inevitable.