Hume's Political Discourses — David Hume — John Shaqi
Hume's Political Discourses
David Hume · en
The case is precisely the same with the political or civil duty of
allegiance as with the natural duties of justice and fidelity. Our
primary instincts lead us either to indulge ourselves in unlimited
liberty or to seek dominion over others; and it is this reflection only
which engages us to sacrifice such strong passions to the interests
of peace and order. A very small degree of experience and observation
suffices to teach us that society cannot possibly be maintained without
the authority of magistrates, and that this authority must soon fall
into contempt where exact obedience is not paid to it. The observation
of these general and obvious interests is the source of all
allegiance, and of that moral obligation which we attribute to it.
What necessity, therefore, is there to found the duty of allegiance or
obedience to magistrates on that of fidelity or a regard to promises,
and to suppose that it is the consent of each individual which subjects
him to government, when it appears that both allegiance and fidelity
stand precisely on the same foundation, and are both submitted to by
mankind, on account of the apparent interests and necessities of human
society? We are bound to obey our sovereign, it is said, because we
have given a tacit promise to that purpose. But why are we bound to
observe our promise? It must here be asserted that the commerce and
intercourse of mankind, which are of such mighty advantage, can have no
security where men pay no regard to their engagements. In like manner
may it be said that men could not live at all in society, at least in a
civilized society, without laws and magistrates and judges to prevent
the encroachments of the strong upon the weak, of the violent upon the
just and equitable. The obligation to allegiance being of like force
and authority with the obligation to fidelity, we gain nothing by
resolving the one into the other. The general interests or necessities
of society are sufficient to establish both.
If the reason is asked of that obedience which we are bound to pay
to government, I readily answer, because society could not otherwise
subsist. And this answer is clear and intelligible to all mankind. Your
answer is, because we should keep our word. But besides that, nobody,
till trained in a philosophical system, can either comprehend or relish
this answer; besides this, I say, you find yourself embarrassed when it
is asked why we are bound to keep our word, and you can give no other
answer but what would immediately, without any circuit, have accounted
for our obligation to allegiance.