Whoever considers the history of the several nations of the
world, their revolutions, conquests, increase and diminution,
the manner in which their particular governments are
established, and the successive right transmitted from one
person to another, will soon learn to treat very lightly all
disputes concerning the rights of princes, and will be
convinced that a strict adherence to any general rules, and
the rigid loyalty to particular persons and families, on
which some people set so high a value, are virtues that hold
less of reason than of bigotry and superstition. In this
particular, the study of history confirms the reasonings of
true philosophy, which, showing us the original qualities of
human nature, teaches us to regard the controversies in
politics as incapable of any decision in most cases, and as
entirely subordinate to the interests of peace and liberty.
Where the public good does not evidently demand a change, 'tis
certain that the concurrence of all those titles, _original
contract_, _long possession_, _present possession_,
_succession_, and _positive laws_, forms the strongest title
to sovereignty, and is justly regarded as sacred and
inviolable. But when these titles are mingled and opposed in
different degrees, they often occasion perplexity, and are
less capable of solution from the arguments of lawyers and
philosophers, than from the swords of the soldiery. Who shall
tell me, for instance, whether Germanicus or Drusus ought to
have succeeded Tiberius, had he died while they were both
alive, without naming any of them for his successor? Ought the
right of adoption to be received as equivalent to that of
blood, in a nation where it had the same effect in private
families, and had already, in two instances, taken place in
the public? Ought Germanicus to be esteemed the eldest son,
because he was born before Drusus; or the younger, because he
was adopted after the birth of his brother? Ought the right of
the elder to be regarded in a nation, where the eldest brother
had no advantage in the succession to private families? Ought
the Roman empire at that time to be esteemed hereditary,
because of two examples; or ought it, even so early, to be
regarded as belonging to the stronger, or the present
possessor, as being founded on so recent an usurpation? Upon
whatever principles we may pretend to answer these and
such-like questions, I am afraid we shall never be able to
satisfy an impartial inquirer, who adopts no party in
political controversies, and will be satisfied with nothing
but sound reason and philosophy.[124:1]