as in the case of the physical operations of nature, may be subjected to the rules of induction. Hume himself held that mental phenomena are as regular, and as capable of having laws of nature applied to them, as physical phenomena. But even if he were right, there is a disturbing influence at force in the circumstance, that, as the operation of induction is itself a phenomenon of the same class with those professed to be subjected to its observation, the philosopher is apt to embody in his writings the intuitions, if they may be so termed, of his own mind, instead of giving such an accurate transcript of the results of external observation as the physical inquirer is generally enabled to present. Indeed, it is in promulgating the convictions of his own mind as a metaphysical thinker, more than in his avowed project of inducting from the common phenomena of the every-day world, that Reid's writings are most valuable. In the one case he has told us how far Hume's philosophy is at variance with the general opinions of mankind; in which he is met by the comprehensive argument, that Hume may, nevertheless, be right, and the rest of mankind wrong. But in travelling beyond his avowed object he certainly has anticipated many of those metaphysical arguments, on which the basis of the sceptical philosophy has been attacked; and the world has, perhaps, yet to learn how far the great system of the German philosophers is under obligations to this powerful thinker.[153:1] Before he put his "Inquiry into the Human Mind," to press, Reid desired, through Blair's interposition, to subject the manuscript to Hume's inspection. Fearing that this work might too closely follow the Warburton school, Hume met the application with the rather petulant remark: "I wish that the parsons would confine themselves to their old occupation of worrying one another, and leave philosophers to argue with temper, moderation, and good manners." But, after inspecting the manuscript, he thus addressed its author: