Philosophical Works, v. 1 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author — David Hume — John Shaqi
Philosophical Works, v. 1 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author
David Hume · en
A surface terminates a solid; a line terminates a surface; a point
terminates a line; but I assert, that if the _ideas_ of a point, line,
or surface, were not indivisible, 'tis impossible we should ever
conceive these terminations. For let these ideas be supposed infinitely
divisible, and then let the fancy endeavour to fix itself on the idea
of the last surface, line, or point, it immediately finds this idea
to break into parts; and upon its seizing the last of these parts it
loses its hold by a new division, and so on _in infinitum_, without
any possibility of its arriving at a concluding idea. The number of
fractions bring it no nearer the last division than the first idea
it formed. Every particle eludes the grasp by a new fraction, like
quicksilver, when we endeavour to seize it. But as in fact there must
be something which terminates the idea of every finite quantity, and as
this terminating idea cannot itself consist of parts or inferior ideas,
otherwise it would be the last of its parts, which finished the idea,
and so on; this is a clear proof, that the ideas of surfaces, lines,
and points, admit not of any division; those of surfaces in depth, of
lines in breadth and depth, and of points in any dimension.
The _schoolmen_ were so sensible of the force of this argument, that
some of them maintained that nature has mixed among those particles of
matter, which are divisible _in infinitum_, a number of mathematical
points in order to give a termination to bodies; and others eluded
the force of this reasoning by a heap of unintelligible cavils and
distinctions. Both these adversaries equally yield the victory. A man
who hides himself confesses as evidently the superiority of his enemy,
as another, who fairly delivers his arms.
Thus it appears, that the definitions of mathematics destroy the
pretended demonstrations; and that if we have the idea of indivisible
points, lines, and surfaces, conformable to the definition, their
existence is certainly possible; but if we have no such idea, 'tis
impossible we can ever conceive the termination of any figure, without
which conception there can be no geometrical demonstration.
But I go farther, and maintain, that none of these demonstrations
can have sufficient weight to establish such a principle as this of
infinite divisibility; and that because with regard to such minute
objects, they are not properly demonstrations, being built on ideas
which are not exact, and maxims which are not precisely true. When
geometry decides any thing concerning the proportions of quantity, we
ought not to look for the utmost _precision_ and exactness. None of
its proofs extend so far: it takes the dimensions and proportions of
figures justly; but roughly, and with some liberty. Its errors are
never considerable, nor would it err at all, did it not aspire to such
an absolute perfection.