Philosophical Works, v. 1 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author
David Hume · en
There are some who pretend,[6] that equality is best defined by
_congruity_, and that any two figures are equal, when upon the placing
of one upon the other, all their parts correspond to and touch each
other. In order to judge of this definition let us consider, that since
equality is a relation, it is not, strictly speaking, a property in the
figures themselves, but arises merely from the comparison which the
mind makes betwixt them. If it consists therefore in this imaginary
application and mutual contact of parts, we must at least have a
distinct notion of these parts, and must conceive their contact. Now
'tis plain, that in this conception, we would run up these parts to the
greatest minuteness which can possibly be conceived, since the contact
of large parts would never render the figures equal. But the minutest
parts we can conceive are mathematical points, and consequently this
standard of equality is the same with that derived from the equality of
the number of points, which we have already determined to be a just
but an useless standard. We must therefore look to some other quarter
for a solution of the present difficulty.
There are many philosophers, who refuse to assign any standard of
_equality_, but assert, that 'tis sufficient to present two objects,
that are equal, in order to give us a just notion of this proportion.
All definitions, say they, are fruitless without the perception of such
objects; and where we perceive such objects we no longer stand in need
of any definition. To this reasoning I entirely agree; and assert, that
the only useful notion of equality, or inequality, is derived from the
whole united appearance and the comparison of particular objects.
'Tis evident that the eye, or rather the mind, is often able at one
view to determine the proportions of bodies, and pronounce them equal
to, or greater or less than each other, without examining or comparing
the number of their minute parts. Such judgments are not only common,
but in many cases certain and infallible. When the measure of a yard
and that of a foot are presented, the mind can no more question,
that the first is longer than the second, than it can doubt of those
principles which are the most clear and self-evident.