Philosophical Works, v. 1 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author
David Hume · en
I might give as instances those arguments for infinite divisibility,
which are derived from the _point of contact_. I know there is no
mathematician, who will not refuse to be judged by the diagrams he
describes upon paper, these being loose draughts, as he will tell us,
and serving only to convey with greater facility certain ideas, which
are the true foundation of all our reasoning. This I am satisfied with,
and am willing to rest the controversy merely upon these ideas. I
desire therefore our mathematician to form, as accurately as possible,
the ideas of a circle and a right line; and I then ask, if upon the
conception of their contact he can conceive them as touching in a
mathematical point, or if he must necessarily imagine them to concur
for some space. Whichever side he chooses, he runs himself into equal
difficulties. If he affirms, that in tracing these figures in his
imagination, he can imagine them to touch only in a point, he allows
the possibility of that idea, and consequently of the thing. If he
says, that in his conception of the contact of those lines he must
make them concur, he thereby acknowledges the fallacy of geometrical
demonstrations, when carried beyond a certain degree of minuteness;
since, 'tis certain he has such demonstrations against the concurrence
of a circle and a right line; that is, in other words, he can prove an
idea, viz. that of concurrence, to be _incompatible_ with two other
ideas, viz. those of a circle and right line; though at the same time
he acknowledges these ideas to be _inseparable_.
[5] L'Art de penser.
[6] See Dr Barrow's Mathematical Lectures.
SECTION V.
THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.
If the second part of my system be true, _that the idea of space
or extension is nothing but the idea of visible or tangible points
distributed in a certain order_, it follows, that we can form no idea
of a vacuum, or space, where there is nothing visible or tangible. This
gives rise to three objections, which I shall examine together, because
the answer I shall give to one is a consequence of that which I shall
make use of for the others.
First, it may be said, that men have disputed for many ages concerning
a vacuum and a plenum, without being able to bring the affair to a
final decision: and philosophers, even at this day, think themselves
at liberty to take party on either side, as their fancy leads them.
But whatever foundation there may be for a controversy concerning
the things themselves, it may be pretended that the very dispute is
decisive concerning the idea, and that 'tis impossible men could so
long reason about a vacuum, and either refute or defend it, without
having a notion of what they refuted or defended.