Philosophical Works, v. 1 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author — David Hume — John Shaqi
Philosophical Works, v. 1 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author
David Hume · en
To begin with the first case; 'tis evident, that when only two luminous
bodies appear to the eye, we can perceive whether they be conjoined or
separate; whether they be separated by a great or small distance; and
if this distance varies, we can perceive its increase or diminution,
with the motion of the bodies. But as the distance is not in this case
any thing coloured or visible, it may be thought that there is here
a vacuum or pure extension, not only intelligible to the mind, but
obvious to the very senses.
This is our natural and most familiar way of thinking, but which we
shall learn to correct by a little reflection. We may observe, that
when two bodies present themselves, where there was formerly an entire
darkness, the only change that is discoverable is in the appearance of
these two objects, and that all the rest continues to be as before, a
perfect negation of light, and of every coloured or visible object.
This is not only true of what may be said to be remote from these
bodies, but also of the very distance which is interposed betwixt them;
_that_ being nothing but darkness, or the negation of light; without
parts, without composition, invariable and indivisible. Now, since
this distance causes no perception different from what a blind man
receives from his eyes, or what is conveyed to us in the darkest night,
it must partake of the same properties; and as blindness and darkness
afford us no ideas of extension, 'tis impossible that the dark and
undistinguishable distance betwixt two bodies can ever produce that
idea.
The sole difference betwixt an absolute darkness and the appearance
of two or more visible luminous objects consists, as I said, in the
objects themselves, and in the manner they affect our senses. The
angles, which the rays of light flowing from them form with each other;
the motion that is required in the eye, in its passage from one to
the other; and the different parts of the organs which are affected
by them; these produce the only perceptions from which we can judge
of the distance. But as these perceptions are each of them simple and
indivisible, they can never give us the idea of extension.