Philosophical Works, v. 1 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author
David Hume · en
We might proceed, after the same manner, in fixing the _proportions_
of _quantity_ or _number_, and might at one view observe a superiority
or inferiority betwixt any numbers, or figures; especially where the
difference is very great and remarkable. As to equality or any exact
proportion, we can only guess at it from a single consideration; except
in very short numbers, or very limited portions of extension; which are
comprehended in an instant, and where we perceive an impossibility of
falling into any considerable error. In all other cases we must settle
the proportions with some liberty, or proceed in a more _artificial_
manner.
I have already observed, that geometry, or the _art_ by which we fix
the proportions of figures; though it much excels both in universality
and exactness, the loose judgments of the senses and imagination; yet
never attains a perfect precision and exactness. Its first principles
are still drawn from the general appearance of the objects; and that
appearance can never afford us any security, when we examine the
prodigious minuteness of which nature is susceptible. Our ideas seem
to give a perfect assurance, that no two right lines can have a common
segment; but if we consider these ideas, we shall find, that they
always suppose a sensible inclination of the two lines, and that where
the angle they form is extremely small, we have no standard of a right
line so precise as to assure us of the truth of this proposition. 'Tis
the same case with most of the primary decisions of the mathematics.
There remain therefore algebra and arithmetic as the only sciences, in
which we can carry on a chain of reasoning to any degree of intricacy,
and yet preserve a perfect exactness and certainty. We are possessed
of a precise standard, by which we can judge of the equality and
proportion of numbers; and according as they correspond or not to that
standard, we determine their relations, without any possibility of
error. When two numbers are so combined, as that the one has always an
unite answering to every unite of the other, we pronounce them equal;
and 'tis for want of such a standard of equality in extension, that
geometry can scarce be esteemed a perfect and infallible science.