Philosophical Works, v. 1 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author
David Hume · en
As belief is almost absolutely requisite to the exciting our passions,
so the passions, in their turn, are very favourable to belief; and
not only such facts as convey agreeable emotions, but very often such
as give pain, do upon that account become more readily the objects of
faith and opinion. A coward, whose fears are easily awakened, readily
assents to every account of danger he meets with; as a person of a
sorrowful and melancholy disposition is very credulous of every thing
that nourishes his prevailing passion. When any affecting object is
presented, it gives the alarm, and excites immediately a degree of
its proper passion; especially in persons who are naturally inclined
to that passion. This emotion passes by an easy transition to the
imagination; and, diffusing itself over our idea of the affecting
object, makes us form that idea with greater force and vivacity,
and consequently assent to it, according to the precedent system.
Admiration and surprise have the same effect as the other passions;
and accordingly we may observe, that among the vulgar, quacks
and projectors meet with a more easy faith upon account of their
magnificent pretensions, than if they kept themselves within the
bounds of moderation. The first astonishment, which naturally attends
their miraculous relations, spreads itself over the whole soul, and so
vivifies and enlivens the idea, that it resembles the inferences we
draw from experience. This is a mystery, with which we may be already a
little acquainted, and which we shall have further occasion to be let
into in the progress of this Treatise.
After this account of the influence of belief on the passions, we shall
find less difficulty in explaining its effects on the imagination,
however extraordinary they may appear. 'Tis certain we cannot take
pleasure in any discourse, where our judgment gives no assent to those
images which are presented to our fancy. The conversation of those, who
have acquired a habit of lying, though in affairs of no moment, never
gives any satisfaction; and that because those ideas they present to
us, not being attended with belief, make no impression upon the mind.
Poets themselves, though liars by profession, always endeavour to give
an air of truth to their fictions; and where that is totally neglected,
their performances, however ingenious, will never be able to afford
much pleasure. In short, we may observe, that even when ideas have no
manner of influence on the will and passions, truth and reality are
still requisite, in order to make them entertaining to the imagination.