Philosophical Works, v. 1 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author
David Hume · en
complete image or picture. It may seem to set the object before us in
more lively colours. But still the ideas it presents are different to
the _feeling_ from those which arise from the memory and the judgment.
There is something weak and imperfect amidst all that seeming vehemence
of thought and sentiment which attends the fictions of poetry.
We shall afterwards have occasion to remark both the resemblances and
differences betwixt a poetical enthusiasm and a serious conviction. In
the mean time, I cannot forbear observing, that the great difference in
their feeling proceeds, in some measure, from reflection and _general
rules_. We observe, that the vigour of conception which fictions
receive from poetry and eloquence, is a circumstance merely accidental,
of which every idea is equally susceptible; and that such fictions are
connected with nothing that is real. This observation makes us only
lend ourselves, so to speak, to the fiction, but causes the idea to
feel very different from the eternal established persuasions founded on
memory and custom. They are somewhat of the same kind; but the one is
much inferior to the other, both in its causes and effects.
A like reflection on _general rules_ keeps us from augmenting our
belief upon every increase of the force and vivacity of our ideas.
Where an opinion admits of no doubt, or opposite probability, we
attribute to it a full conviction; though the want of resemblance, or
contiguity, may render its force inferior to that of other opinions.
'Tis thus the understanding corrects the appearances of the senses, and
makes us imagine, that an object at twenty foot distance seems even to
the eye as large as one of the same dimensions at ten.
We may observe the same effect of poetry in a lesser degree; only with
this difference, that the least reflection dissipates the illusions
of poetry, and places the objects in their proper light. 'Tis however
certain, that in the warmth of a poetical enthusiasm, a poet has a
counterfeit belief, and even a kind of vision of his objects; and
if there be any shadow of argument to support this belief nothing
contributes more to his full conviction than a blaze of poetical
figures and images, which have their effect upon the poet himself, as
well as upon his readers.
SECTION XI.
OF THE PROBABILITY OF CHANCES.
But in order to bestow on this system its full force and evidence, we
must carry our eye from it a moment to consider its consequences, and
explain, from the same principles, some other species of reasoning
which are derived from the same origin.