Philosophical Works, v. 1 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author
David Hume · en
Since, therefore, an entire indifference is essential to chance, no
one chance can possibly be superior to another, otherwise than as it
is composed of a superior number of equal chances. For if we affirm
that one chance can, after any other manner, be superior to another,
we must at the same time affirm, that there is something which gives
it the superiority, and determines the event rather to that side than
the other; that is, in other words, we must allow of a cause, and
destroy the supposition of chance, which we had before established. A
perfect and total indifference is essential to chance, and one total
indifference can never in itself be either superior or inferior to
another. This truth is not peculiar to my system, but is acknowledged
by every one that forms calculations concerning chances.
And here 'tis remarkable, that though chance and causation be directly
contrary, yet 'tis impossible for us to conceive this combination of
chances, which is requisite to render one hazard superior to another,
without supposing a mixture of causes among the chances, and a
conjunction of necessity in some particulars, with a total indifference
in others. Where nothing limits the chances, every notion that the
most extravagant fancy can form is upon a footing of equality; nor can
there be any circumstance to give one the advantage above another.
Thus, unless we allow that there are some causes to make the dice fall,
and preserve their form in their fall, and lie upon some one of their
sides, we can form no calculation concerning the laws of hazard. But
supposing these causes to operate, and supposing likewise all the rest
to be indifferent and to be determined by chance, 'tis easy to arrive
at a notion of a superior combination of chances. A dye that has four
sides marked with a certain number of spots, and only two with another,
affords us an obvious and easy instance of this superiority. The mind
is here limited by the causes to such a precise number and quality of
the events; and, at the same time, is undetermined in its choice of any
particular event.