Philosophical Works, v. 1 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author
David Hume · en
In order to clear up this difficulty, we shall suppose a person to take
a dye, formed after such a manner as that four of its sides are marked
with one figure, or one number of spots, and two with another; and to
put this dye into the box with an intention of throwing it: 'tis plain,
he must conclude the one figure to be more probable than the other,
and give the preference to that which is inscribed on the greatest
number of sides. He in a manner believes that this will lie uppermost;
though still with hesitation and doubt, in proportion to the number of
chances which are contrary: and according as these contrary chances
diminish, and the superiority increases on the other side, his belief
acquires new degrees of stability and assurance. This belief arises
from an operation of the mind upon the simple and limited object before
us; and therefore its nature will be the more easily discovered and
explained. We have nothing but one single dye to contemplate, in order
to comprehend one of the most curious operations of the understanding.
This dye formed as above, contains three circumstances worthy of our
attention. First, certain causes, such as gravity, solidity, a cubical
figure, &c. which determine it to fall, to preserve its form in its
fall, and to turn up one of its sides. Secondly, a certain number
of sides, which are supposed indifferent. Thirdly, a certain figure
inscribed on each side. These three particulars, form the whole nature
of the dye, so far as relates to our present purpose; and consequently
are the only circumstances regarded by the mind in its forming a
judgment concerning the result of such a throw. Let us therefore
consider gradually and carefully what must be the influence of these
circumstances on the thought and imagination.
First, we have already observed, that the mind is determined by custom
to pass from any cause to its effect, and that upon the appearance
of the one, 'tis almost impossible for it not to form an idea of the
other. Their constant conjunction in past instances has produced such
a habit in the mind, that it always conjoins them in its thought, and
infers the existence of the one from that of its usual attendant. When
it considers the dye as no longer supported by the box, it cannot
without violence regard it as suspended in the air; but naturally
places it on the table, and views it as turning up one of its sides.
This is the effect of the intermingled causes, which are requisite to
our forming any calculation concerning chances.