Philosophical Works, v. 1 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author
David Hume · en
The imagination naturally runs on in this train of thinking. Our
perceptions are our only objects: resembling perceptions are the
same, however broken or uninterrupted in their appearance: this
appearing interruption is contrary to the identity: the interruption
consequently extends not beyond the appearance, and the perception
or object really continues to exist, even when absent from us: our
sensible perceptions have, therefore, a continued and uninterrupted
existence. But as a little reflection destroys this conclusion, that
our perceptions have a continued existence, by showing that they have a
dependent one, 'twould naturally be expected, that we must altogether
reject the opinion, that there is such a thing in nature as a continued
existence, which is preserved even when it no longer appears to the
senses. The case, however, is otherwise. Philosophers are so far from
rejecting the opinion of a continued existence upon rejecting that of
the independence and continuance of our sensible perceptions, that
though all sects agree in the latter sentiment, the former, which is
in a manner its necessary consequence, has been peculiar to a few
extravagant sceptics; who, after all, maintained that opinion in words
only, and were never able to bring themselves sincerely to believe it.
There is a great difference betwixt such opinions as we form after
a calm and profound reflection, and such as we embrace by a kind of
instinct or natural impulse, on account of their suitableness and
conformity to the mind. If these opinions become contrary, 'tis not
difficult to foresee which of them will have the advantage. As long as
our attention is bent upon the subject, the philosophical and studied
principle may prevail; but the moment we relax our thoughts, nature
will display herself, and draw us back to our former opinion. Nay she
has sometimes such an influence, that she can stop our progress, even
in the midst of our most profound reflections, and keep us from running
on with all the consequences of any philosophical opinion. Thus, though
we clearly perceive the dependence and interruption of our perceptions,
we stop short in our career, and never upon that account reject the
notion of an independent and continued existence. That opinion has
taken such deep root in the imagination, that 'tis impossible ever to
eradicate it, nor will any strained metaphysical conviction of the
dependence of our perceptions be sufficient for that purpose.