Philosophical Works, v. 1 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author — David Hume — John Shaqi
Philosophical Works, v. 1 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author
David Hume · en
Another advantage of this philosophical system is its similarity to
the vulgar one, by which means we can humour our reason for a moment,
when it becomes troublesome and solicitous; and yet upon its least
negligence or inattention, can easily return to our vulgar and natural
notions. Accordingly we find, that philosophers neglect not this
advantage, but, immediately upon leaving their closets, mingle with the
rest of mankind in those exploded opinions, that our perceptions are
our only objects, and continue identically and uninterruptedly the same
in all their interrupted appearances.
There are other particulars of this system, wherein we may remark its
dependence on the fancy, in a very conspicuous manner. Of these, I
shall observe the two following. _First_, we suppose external objects
to resemble internal perceptions. I have already shown, that the
relation of cause and effect can never afford us any just conclusion
from the existence or qualities of our perceptions to the existence of
external continued objects: and I shall farther add, that even though
they could afford such a conclusion, we should never have any reason
to infer that our objects resemble our perceptions. That opinion,
therefore, is derived from nothing but the quality of the fancy
above explained, _that it borrows all its ideas from some precedent
perception_. We never can conceive any thing but perceptions, and
therefore must make every thing resemble them.
Secondly, as we suppose our objects in general to resemble our
perceptions, so we take it for granted, that every particular object
resembles that perception which it causes. The relation of cause and
effect determines us to join the other of resemblance; and the ideas
of these existences being already united together in the fancy by the
former relation, we naturally add the latter to complete the union.
We have a strong propensity to complete every union by joining new
relations to those which we have before observed betwixt any ideas, as
we shall have occasion to observe presently.[8]