Philosophical Works, v. 1 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author
David Hume · en
There is a very remarkable circumstance that attends this experiment;
which is, that though the change of any considerable part in a mass
of matter destroys the identity of the whole, yet we must measure
the greatness of the part, not absolutely, but by its _proportion_
to the whole. The addition or diminution of a mountain would not be
sufficient to produce a diversity in a planet; though the change of a
very few inches would be able to destroy the identity of some bodies.
'Twill be impossible to account for this, but by reflecting that
objects operate upon the mind, and break or interrupt the continuity of
its actions, not according to their real greatness, but according to
their proportion to each other; and therefore, since this interruption
makes an object cease to appear the same, it must be the uninterrupted
progress of the thought which constitutes the imperfect identity.
This may be confirmed by another phenomenon. A change in any
considerable part of a body destroys its identity; but 'tis remarkable,
that where the change is produced _gradually_ and _insensibly_, we
are less apt to ascribe to it the same effect. The reason can plainly
be no other, than that the mind, in following the successive changes
of the body, feels an easy passage from the surveying its condition
in one moment, to the viewing of it in another, and in no particular
time perceives any interruption in its actions. From which continued
perception, it ascribes a continued existence and identity to the
object.
But whatever precaution we may use in introducing the changes
gradually, and making them proportionable to the whole, 'tis certain,
that where the changes are at last observed to become considerable, we
make a scruple of ascribing identity to such different objects. There
is, however, another artifice, by which we may induce the imagination
to advance a step farther; and that is, by producing a reference of the
parts to each other, and a combination to some _common end_ or purpose.
A ship, of which a considerable part has been changed by frequent
reparations, is still considered as the same; nor does the difference
of the materials hinder us from ascribing an identity to it. The
common end, in which the parts conspire, is the same under all their
variations, and affords an easy transition of the imagination from one
situation of the body to another.