Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author
David Hume · en
In general we may remark, that the minds of men are mirrors to one
another, not only because they reflect each others emotions, but also
because those rays of passions, sentiments and opinions, may be often
reverberated, and may decay away by insensible degrees. Thus, the
pleasure which a rich man receives from his possessions, being thrown
upon the beholder, causes a pleasure and esteem; which sentiments again
being perceived and sympathized with, increase the pleasure of the
possessor, and, being once more reflected, become a new foundation for
pleasure and esteem in the beholder. There is certainly an original
satisfaction in riches derived from that power which they bestow of
enjoying all the pleasures of life; and as this is their very nature
and essence, it must be the first source of all the passions which
arise from them. One of the most considerable of these passions is
that of love or esteem in others, which, therefore, proceeds from a
sympathy with the pleasure of the possessor. But the possessor has also
a secondary satisfaction in riches, arising from the love and esteem
he acquires by them; and this satisfaction is nothing but a second
reflection of that original pleasure which proceeded from himself.
This secondary satisfaction or vanity becomes one of the principal
recommendations of riches, and is the chief reason why we either
desire them for ourselves, or esteem them in others. Here then is a
third rebound of the original pleasure, after which 'tis difficult to
distinguish the images and reflections, by reason of their faintness
and confusion.
SECTION VI.
OF BENEVOLENCE AND ANGER.
Ideas may be compared to the extension and solidity of matter and
impressions, especially reflective ones, to colours, tastes, smells,
and other sensible qualities. Ideas never admit of a total union, but
are endowed with a kind of impenetrability by which they exclude each
other, and are capable of forming a compound by their conjunction,
not by their mixture. On the other hand, impressions and passions are
susceptible of an entire union, and, like colours, may be blended so
perfectly together, that each of them may lose itself, and contribute
only to vary that uniform impression which arises from the whole. Some
of the most curious phenomena of the human mind are derived from this
property of the passions.