This Aristotle calls essence in its first, chief, and strictest sense, nor is it said of any subject nor as existing in any subject.[16] But he speaks of the subject as if it were genus when he said “animal” of all the animals severally ranged under it, such as an ox, a horse, and the rest, describing them by a common name. For it is true to say that man is an animal, and a horse is an animal and an ox is an animal and all the rest. This is subjective, the one (name) being likewise capable of being said of many [Sidenote: p. 340.] and different species.[17] For neither a horse nor an ox differs from man _quâ_ animal; for the definition of animal fits all the aforesaid animals alike. For what is an animal? If we define it, a common definition will include all the animals. For an animal is a living,[18] feeling being, such as a man, a horse and all the rest. But, “in the Subject,” he says, is that which exists in anything, not as part of it, but as being incapable of existing apart from that wherein it is, (and is) each[19] of the accidents of being. The which is called Quality because by it we say _what_ certain things are, as, for instance, white, green, black, just, unjust, prudent and such like. But none of these (qualities) can come into being by itself, but must needs be in[20] something. But, if neither the “animal,” which is the word I use for all living beings taken severally, nor the “accidents” which are found to occur in all of them, can come into being of themselves, then from those things which do not exist, the individual things[21] are developed and the triply-divided essence is not compounded[22] from other things. Hence Being[23] so called in its first and chiefest and strictest sense, [Sidenote: p. 341.] exists according to Aristotle from those things which do not exist.[24]