The Great Lord Burghley: A study in Elizabethan statecraft — David Hume — John Shaqi
The Great Lord Burghley: A study in Elizabethan statecraft
David Hume · en
The plague had raged in London for the whole of the summer of 1569, and a
recrudescence of it in the following June gave Cecil a good opportunity
for advocating Norfolk’s partial enlargement. The Duke made a most
solemn renunciation of his proposed marriage with Mary, and craved
Elizabeth’s forgiveness; and at length in August was allowed to retire
to his own house. That he owed his liberation to Cecil is clear from
his letters. At the beginning of July, apparently, some person—probably
Leicester—had told the Duke that Cecil was against him, and the Secretary
showed him how false this was, and proposed to take action against his
slanderers. The Duke in reply thanked him for his friendly dealing and
his frank explanation, “which have sufficiently purged him (Cecil) and
laid the fault on those who deserved it.” But he begged him to refrain
from further action, as it might cause mischief.[317] When Norfolk at
length was “rid of yonder pestylent infectyous hows” (the Tower), he
unhesitatingly attributed his release to Cecil. How busy the slanderers
of the Secretary were, and how deeply he felt the wounds they dealt him,
may be seen in another statement in his own hand of the same period[318]
(July 1570), which contains an indignant denial of the reports that
had been spread with regard to his alleged dishonest dealing with the
property of his ward the Earl of Oxford.
During the whole of Norfolk’s stay in the Tower and afterwards, the
love-letters between him and Mary continued, the Queen signing her
letters “your own faithful to death,” and using many similar terms of
endearment;[319] and Cecil could hardly have been entirely ignorant
of the Duke’s bad faith. But for political reasons it was considered
necessary, not only to conciliate him, but Mary and the Spaniards as
well. Concurrently, therefore, with the negotiations for Norfolk’s
release, a show of willingness was made to come to terms with Mary.
Her presence in England was an embarrassment and a danger, and now
that Murray was dead, the principal personal obstacle to her return
had disappeared. If she could be so tied down as to be used as a means
for pacifying Scotland, whilst depending for the future entirely
upon England, her return to her country would relieve Elizabeth of a
difficulty. The first basis of negotiation was the surrender of the
English rebel Lords in exchange for her, and the delivery to England of
four or six of the principal Scottish nobles and the young Prince as
hostages. But these terms were by no means acceptable to Mary’s agents or
to herself. She feared that the Scots would kill her, and the English her
son, and so secure the joint kingdoms to a nominee of Elizabeth or Cecil.