As no one had proposed this East Tennessee campaign to the General, I thought it possible that we might accomplish something by encouraging his own move, and (I) proposed the following plan, viz: To withdraw from our present lines, and the forces now in East Tennessee: the latter to be done in order to give the impression to the enemy that we were retiring from East Tennessee, and concentrating here for battle or for some other movement, and place our army in a strong (concentrated) position. The moment the army was together, make a detachment of 20,000 to move rapidly against Burnside and destroy him; and by continued rapid movements, to threaten the enemy’s rear and his communications to the extent that might be necessary to draw him out from his present position. This, at least, is a tedious process, but I thought it gave promise of some results, and was therefore better than lying here destroying ourselves. The move, as I proposed it, would have left this army (Bragg’s) in a strong position and safe, and would have made sure the capture of Burnside. That is, the army here could spare 20,000 if it were in the position that I proposed, better than it can spare 12,000, occupying the lines that it now does. Twenty thousand men well handled could surely have captured Burnside and forces. Under present arrangements, however, the lines are to be held as they now are, and the detachment is to be of say, 12,000. We thus expose both to failure, and really take no chance to ourselves of great results. The only notice my plan received was a remark that General Hardee was pleased to make: ‘I don’t think that that is a bad idea of Longstreet’s.’ I undertook to explain the danger of having such a long line under the fire of the enemy’s batteries, and he concentrated, as it were, right in our midst, and within twenty minutes march of any portion of our line. But I was assured that he would not disturb us. I repeated my ideas, but they did not even receive notice. ’Twas not till I had repeated my plan, however, that Gen. Hardee even noticed me. Have you any maps that you can give or lend me? I shall need every thing of the kind. Do you know any reliable people living near and east of Knoxville, from whom I might get information of the condition, strength, &c., of the enemy. I have written in such hurry and confusion of packing and striking camp, that I doubt if I have made myself understood. I remain very sincerely your friend, (Signed) J. LONGSTREET, Lieutenant General. APPENDIX: NOTE S: Page 246. [The night ride of Refugees to Kentucky.]