A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' — Kant — John Shaqi
A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'
Kant · en
Metaphysics is ripe for a similar advance. It must be promoted to the
rank of positive science by the transforming power of an analogous
method. The fundamental and distinguishing characteristic of
mathematical and physical procedure is the legislative power to which
reason lays claim. Such procedure, if generalised and extended, will
supply the required method of the new philosophy. Reason must be
regarded as self-legislative in all the domains of our possible
knowledge. _Objects must be viewed as conforming to human thought, not
human thought to the independently real._ This is the “hypothesis” to
which Kant has given the somewhat misleading title, “Copernican.”[113]
The _method of procedure_ which it prescribes is, he declares, analogous
to that which was followed by Copernicus, and will be found to be as
revolutionary in its consequences. In terms of this hypothesis a
complete and absolutely certain metaphysics, valid now and for all time,
can be created at a stroke. The earliest and oldest enterprise of the
human mind will achieve a new beginning. Metaphysics, the mother of all
the sciences, will renew her youth, and will equal in assurance, as she
surpasses in dignity, the offspring of her womb.
From this new standpoint Kant develops phenomenalism on rationalist
lines. He professes to prove that though our knowledge is only of
appearances, it is conditioned by _a priori_ principles. His “Copernican
hypothesis,” so far from destroying positive science, is, he claims,
merely a philosophical extension of the method which it has long been
practising. Since all science worthy of the name involves _a priori_
elements, it can be accounted for only in terms of the new hypothesis.
Only if objects are regarded as conforming to our forms of intuition,
and to our modes of conception, can they be anticipated by _a priori_
reasoning. Science can be _a priori_ just because, properly understood,
it is not a rival of metaphysics, and does not attempt to define the
absolutely real.