Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay — Kant — John Shaqi
Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay
Kant · en
Every form of government in fact which is not representative is
really no true constitution at all, because a law-giver may no more
be, in one and the same person, the administrator of his own will,
than the universal major premise of a syllogism may be, at the same
time, the subsumption under itself of the particulars contained
in the minor premise. And, although the other two constitutions,
autocracy and aristocracy, are always defective in so far as
they leave the way open for such a form of government, yet there
is at least always a possibility in these cases, that they may
take the form of a government in accordance with the spirit of a
representative system. Thus Frederick the Great used at least to
_say_ that he was “merely the highest servant of the state.”[122] The
democratic constitution, on the other hand, makes this impossible,
because under such a government every one wishes to be master. We
may therefore say that the smaller the staff of the executive—that
is to say, the number of rulers—and the more real, on the other
hand, their representation of the people, so much the more is the
government of the state in accordance with a possible republicanism;
and it may hope by gradual reforms to raise itself to that standard.
For this reason, it is more difficult under an aristocracy than
under a monarchy—while under a democracy it is impossible except by
a violent revolution—to attain to this, the one perfectly lawful
constitution. The kind of government,[123] however, is of infinitely
more importance to the people than the kind of constitution,
although the greater or less aptitude of a people for this ideal
greatly depends upon such external form. The form of government,
however, if it is to be in accordance with the idea of right, must
embody the representative system in which alone a republican form
of administration is possible and without which it is despotic
and violent, be the constitution what it may. None of the ancient
so-called republics were aware of this, and they necessarily slipped
into absolute despotism which, of all despotisms, is most endurable
under the sovereignty of one individual.
[122] The lofty appellations which are often given to a
ruler—such as the Lord’s Anointed, the Administrator of the
Divine Will upon earth and Vicar of God—have been many times
censured as flattery gross enough to make one giddy. But it
seems to me without cause. Far from making a prince arrogant,
names like these must rather make him humble at heart, if he has
any intelligence—which we take for granted he has—and reflects
that he has undertaken an office which is too great for any
human being. For, indeed, it is the holiest which God has on
earth—namely, the right of ruling mankind: and he must ever live
in fear of injuring this treasure of God in some respect or other.