A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive (Vol. 1 of 2)
John Stuart Mill · en
Now, there are philosophers who have argued as follows. If we take an
orange, and conceive it to be divested of its natural colour without
acquiring any new one; to lose its softness without becoming hard, its
roundness without becoming square or pentagonal, or of any other regular
or irregular figure whatever; to be deprived of size, of weight, of taste,
of smell; to lose all its mechanical and all its chemical properties, and
acquire no new ones; to become, in short, invisible, intangible,
imperceptible not only by all our senses, but by the senses of all other
sentient beings, real or possible; nothing, say these thinkers, would
remain. For of what nature, they ask, could be the residuum? and by what
token could it manifest its presence? To the unreflecting its existence
seems to rest on the evidence of the senses. But to the senses nothing is
apparent except the sensations. We know, indeed, that these sensations are
bound together by some law; they do not come together at random, but
according to a systematic order, which is part of the order established in
the universe. When we experience one of these sensations, we usually
experience the others also, or know that we have it in our power to
experience them. But a fixed law of connexion, making the sensations occur
together, does not, say these philosophers, necessarily require what is
called a substratum to support them. The conception of a substratum is but
one of many possible forms in which that connexion presents itself to our
imagination; a mode of, as it were, realizing the idea. If there be such a
substratum, suppose it this instant miraculously annihilated, and let the
sensations continue to occur in the same order, and how would the
substratum be missed? By what signs should we be able to discover that its
existence had terminated? should we not have as much reason to believe
that it still existed as we now have? and if we should not then be
warranted in believing it, how can we be so now? A body, therefore,
according to these metaphysicians, is not anything intrinsically different
from the sensations which the body is said to produce in us; it is, in
short, a set of sensations joined together according to a fixed law.