The English Utilitarians, Volume 2 (of 3): James Mill
John Stuart Mill · en
Mill has his remedy for this deeply seated evil. He attacks, as
Bentham had already done, the old-fashioned theory, according to which
the British Constitution was an admirable mixture of the three 'simple
forms.' Two of the powers, he argues, will always agree to 'swallow up
the third.'[92] 'The monarchy and aristocracy have all possible
motives for endeavouring to obtain unlimited power over the persons
and property of the community,' though the democracy, as he also says,
has every possible motive for preventing them. And in England, as he
no doubt meant his readers to understand, the monarchy and aristocracy
had to a great extent succeeded. Where, then, are we to look? To the
'grand discovery of modern times,' namely, the representative system.
If this does not solve all difficulties we shall be forced to the
conclusion that good government is impossible. Fortunately, however,
the representative system may be made perfectly effective. This
follows easily. It would, as he has said,[93] be a 'contradiction in
terms' to suppose that the community at large can 'have an interest
opposite to its interest,' In the Bentham formula, it can have 'no
sinister interest.' It cannot desire its own misery. Though the
community cannot act as a whole, it can act through representatives.
It is necessary to intrust power to a governing body; but that body
can be prevented by adequate checks from misusing its powers. Indeed,
the common theory of the British Constitution was precisely that the
House of Commons was 'the checking body.'[94] The whole problem is to
secure a body which shall effectively discharge the function thus
attributed in theory to the House of Commons. That will be done when
the body is chosen in such a way that its interests are necessarily
coincident with those of the community at large. Hence there is of
course no difficulty in deducing the actual demands of reformers.
Without defining precise limits, he shows that representatives must be
elected for brief periods, and that the right to a vote must at least
be wide enough to prevent the electoral body from forming a class with
'sinister interests.' He makes some remarkable qualifications, with
the view apparently of not startling his readers too much by absolute
and impracticable claims. He thinks that the necessary identity of
interest would still be secured if classes were unrepresented whose
interests are 'indisputably included in those of others.' Children's
interests are involved in those of their parents, and the interests of
'almost all women' in those of their fathers or husbands.[95] Again,
all men under forty might be omitted without mischief, for 'the great
majority of old men have sons whose interests they regard as an
essential part of their own. This is a law of human nature.'[96] There
would, he observes, be no danger that men above forty would try to
reduce the 'rest of the community to the state of abject slaves.'