The Geneva Protocol — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
The Geneva Protocol
John Stuart Mill · en
Under the Protocol, precisely the same legal situation as to the
blockade of Russia exists as under the Covenant and the same
conclusions would follow. However, the probability of such a blockade
under the Protocol, without an actual state of war resulting, is much
less than under the Covenant. The Protocol provides definitely for
military sanctions and it can hardly be doubted, as a matter of
reality, that if the sanctions of the Protocol commenced to be applied
to a State in or out of the League and that State resisted, the result
would be war as between that resisting State and at least those of the
Members of the League, like Great Britain, that were taking a real part
in the application of the sanctions.
And, as pointed out above, the legal situation is much clearer in the
case of war than in the case of this economic and financial boycott of
the Covenant. It would be much "easier"[7] to go to war than it would
be to apply the economic and financial sanctions alone. The world has
gotten more or less used, in a legal sense, to the legalities and
illegalities of war; but there are no precedents as to the
corresponding situations[8] in such a {93} blockade as has been
suggested; and it is, above all, custom and general agreement that make
international law.
I may sum up my views on this point as follows:
If under either the Covenant or the Protocol, the economic sanctions
were applied either against a Member of the League or a non-Member of
the League and the application of these sanctions did not result in
war, the United States legally could, and very likely would, contend
that any resulting blockade was not applicable to the United States and
the commerce and intercourse of her residents; and this view would be
accepted by the Members of the League as being legally sound; and the
result of course would be that the practical effect of any such
blockade would be very much weakened.
However, if the application of the sanctions either of the Covenant or
of the Protocol resulted in war between the State against which the
sanctions were applied and the States applying them, the United States
could not object to that state of war, although of course it would have
its rights as a neutral in such a war as in any other war and these
neutral rights would not be affected by any provision of either the
Covenant or the Protocol.