The next consideration is the possible application of sanctions against the United States. From the foregoing review of the provisions of the Covenant and of the Protocol it is evident that such action against the United States is possible from a theoretic point of view. It is, however, important here to repeat that there is no possible sanction in either paper against a non-Member of the League except after war breaks out, a war which the non-Member of the League has commenced against a Member or against a Signatory to the Protocol as the case may be. In other words, the sanctions of either paper could only become operative against the United States after the United States had gone to war against a Member of the League. Continuing the theoretic view of the matter, it would be idle to discuss any difference between one kind of sanction and another in such a case. If the United States went to war with State A, a Member of the League, and any other State undertook to {94} apply economic or any other sanctions on behalf of State A and against the United States, it would here be regarded simply as an act of war, creating two or more enemies instead of one. Perhaps from the common sense outlook, such contingencies are not worthy of discussion, for what they would mean if they happened would be either that there was another world war, in which case the provisions of no document would be very important, or else there would be some kind of a minor war such as that between the United States and Spain, in which the other Powers of the world would find some way of keeping their hands off, regardless of legalistic arguments based on the Covenant or on the Protocol or on both. It may be suggested that in the foregoing discussion I have omitted any thought of the possibility of war between the United States and Japan; but I have kept that possibility in mind. Its theoretical possibilities, so far as they might exist by reason of the United States attacking Japan have been considered above. Let us consider the opposite possibility, an attack by Japan on the United States. Suppose, then, that Japan attempted to raise before the League the question of the treatment of her nationals by the United States; there is no way in which such a question could be considered by the League except under the vague general clauses of Article 11 of the Covenant; all that the League could do, even in theory, would be to ask if the United States cared to discuss the matter; and the United States would presumably decline to take part in any such discussion. Further, it may be supposed that the United States would not have the slightest desire to commence a war in the matter as the United States is satisfied with the situation as it is--it is Japan which is dissatisfied. The United States would merely refuse to discuss a question which it deemed domestic.