On the other hand, various features of what I may call the defensive alliance portion of the Protocol seem to me to be impossible and at this time inadvisable. They are supposed to flow logically from the system of compulsory arbitration; and certainly the problem which they attempt to solve does follow logically from any system of compulsory arbitration and outlawry of war. If we assume war to be outlawed and a system by which there is to be a legal settlement of disputes in place of war, the question of course arises: Well, what is to happen in a given case if some State which has accepted this system and has agreed to it should refuse to abide by it, should not carry out an award or decision or should even take up arms against it, what then? The Continental mind very logically answers this question by saying there must be a system of execution of decrees and that if you outlaw war, you must have a combination for defence. This is true from the point of view of logic; but it is not true from the point of view of life. Compulsory arbitration and outlawry of war are untried ideas, and we cannot say now, under all circumstances, what should be done in the course of their working, if they are put to work; much less can Nations now bind themselves as to a definite and complete course of action under all possible and varying future circumstances. That such a system of concerted action against aggression as is proposed by the Protocol of Geneva may perhaps in time be worked out along with the growth and development of the ideas of outlawry of {110} war and of arbitration, may be admitted. That it can be done now is, to my mind, contrary to the realities of life and to the lessons of history. There is another phase of this last discussion which should be particularly noticed. It is impossible for any such agreement for concerted action not to have a direct bearing upon countries which are not parties to the agreement; in other words, Russia and the United States. We must admit at least the theoretic possibility of a conflict between one of the Members of the League and one of these two Great Powers, insisting, if we will, that such a possibility is highly remote so far as the United States is concerned, and utterly unknowable so far as Russia is concerned; but none the less a possibility. And certainly, in view of that possibility, any provisions of a document which looks toward force as a last resort of defence should, in my judgment, be drawn with the utmost care to avoid the idea of a possible conflict between the parties to the document on the one hand and an outside State on the other. Outlawry of war and arbitration are things to be agreed upon and not to be compelled against those who are unwilling to agree; for the breach of such an agreement is a much more serious and a very different thing than a refusal to arbitrate, or even than going to war when there is no agreement.