The Judicial Murder of Mary E. Surratt — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
The Judicial Murder of Mary E. Surratt
John Stuart Mill · en
"Our judicial tribunals, at some future day * * * will be again in the
full exercise of their constitutional powers, and may think, as a
large proportion of the legal profession think now, that your
jurisdiction in these cases is an unwarranted assumption; and they may
treat the judgment which you pronounce and the sentence you cause to
be executed, as your own unauthorized acts.
"Conviction may be easier and more certain in this Military
Commission, than in our constitutional courts. Inexperienced as most
of you are in judicial investigation, you can admit evidence which the
courts would reject, and reject what they would admit, and you may
convict and sentence on evidence which those courts would hold to be
wholly insufficient. Means, too, may be resorted to by detectives,
acting under promise or hope of reward, and operating on the fears or
the cupidity of witnesses, to obtain and introduce evidence, which
cannot be detected and exposed in this military trial, but could be
readily in the free, but guarded, course of investigation before our
regular judicial tribunals. The Judge-Advocate, with whom chiefly
rests the fate of these citizens, is learned in the law, but from his
position he can not be an impartial judge, unless he be more than a
man. He is the prosecutor in the most extended sense of the word. As
in duty bound, before this court was called, he received the reports
of detectives, pre-examined the witnesses, prepared and officially
signed the charges, and, as principal counsel for the Government,
controlled on the trial the presentation, admission and rejection of
evidence. In our courts of law, a lawyer who has heard his client's
story, if transferred from the bar to the bench, may not sit in the
trial of the cause, lest the ermine be sullied through the partiality
of counsel. This is no mere theoretical objection--for the union of
prosecutor and judge works practical injustice to the accused. The
Judge-Advocate controls the admission and rejection of evidence--knows
what will aid and what will injure the case of the prosecution, and
inclines favorably to the one and unfavorably to the other. The
defense is met with a bias of feeling and opinion on the part of the
judge who controls the proceedings of the Court, and on whom, in great
measure, the fate of the accused depends, which morals and law alike
reject."
Whatsoever else may be pleaded in excuse or palliation of the acts of the
Commission, it can never be said that its members were driven on by an
overpowering sense of their duty as soldiers, in blind ignorance of the
Constitution and the law. Each and every officer was made fully aware of
his awful responsibility and apprised of the precarious footing of his
authority.
CHAPTER V.
CHARGE OF JUDGE BINGHAM.