The Genealogy of Morals: The Complete Works, Volume Thirteen, edited by Dr. Oscar Levy.
Nietzsche · en
Undoubtedly the bad conscience is an illness, but an illness like
pregnancy is an illness. If we search out the conditions under which
this illness reaches its most terrible and sublime zenith, we shall see
what really first brought about its entry into the world. But to do
this we must take a long breath, and we must first of all go back once
again to an earlier point of view. The relation at civil law of the
ower to his creditor (which has already been discussed in detail), has
been interpreted once again (and indeed in a manner which historically
is exceedingly remarkable and suspicious) into a relationship, which
is perhaps more incomprehensible to us moderns than to any other era;
that is, into the relationship of the _existing_ generation to its
_ancestors_. Within the original tribal association--we are talking of
primitive times--each living generation recognises a legal obligation
towards the earlier generation, and particularly towards the earliest,
which founded the family (and this is something much more than a mere
sentimental obligation, the existence of which, during the longest
period of man's history, is by no means indisputable). There prevails
in them the conviction that it is only thanks to sacrifices and efforts
of their ancestors, that the race _persists_ at all--and that this
has to be _paid back_ to them by sacrifices and services. Thus is
recognised the _owing_ of a debt, which accumulates continually by
reason of these ancestors never ceasing in their subsequent life as
potent spirits to secure by their power new privileges and advantages
to the race. Gratis, perchance? But there is no gratis for that raw
and "mean-souled" age. What return can be made?--Sacrifice (at first,
nourishment, in its crudest sense), festivals, temples, tributes of
veneration, above all, obedience--since all customs are, _quâ_ works of
the ancestors, equally their precepts and commands--are the ancestors
ever given enough? This suspicion remains and grows: from time to time
it extorts a great wholesale ransom, something monstrous in the way of
repayment of the creditor (the notorious sacrifice of the first-born,
for example, blood, human blood in any case). The _fear_ of ancestors
and their power, the consciousness of owing debts to them, necessarily
increases, according to this kind of logic, in the exact proportion
that the race itself increases, that the race itself becomes more
victorious, more independent, more honoured, more feared. This, and not
the contrary, is the fact. Each step towards race decay, all disastrous
events, all symptoms of degeneration, of approaching disintegration,
always _diminish_ the fear of the founders' spirit, and whittle away
the idea of his sagacity, providence, and potent presence. Conceive
this crude kind of logic carried to its climax: it follows that the
ancestors of the _most powerful_ races must, through the growing fear
that they exercise on the imaginations, grow themselves into monstrous