HERMOGENES: I should explain to you, Socrates, that our friend Cratylus
has been arguing about names; he says that they are natural and not
conventional; not a portion of the human voice which men agree to use;
but that there is a truth or correctness in them, which is the same for
Hellenes as for barbarians. Whereupon I ask him, whether his own name
of Cratylus is a true name or not, and he answers “Yes.” And Socrates?
“Yes.” Then every man’s name, as I tell him, is that which he is
called. To this he replies—“If all the world were to call you
Hermogenes, that would not be your name.” And when I am anxious to have
a further explanation he is ironical and mysterious, and seems to imply
that he has a notion of his own about the matter, if he would only
tell, and could entirely convince me, if he chose to be intelligible.
Tell me, Socrates, what this oracle means; or rather tell me, if you
will be so good, what is your own view of the truth or correctness of
names, which I would far sooner hear.
SOCRATES: Son of Hipponicus, there is an ancient saying, that “hard is
the knowledge of the good.” And the knowledge of names is a great part
of knowledge. If I had not been poor, I might have heard the
fifty-drachma course of the great Prodicus, which is a complete
education in grammar and language—these are his own words—and then I
should have been at once able to answer your question about the
correctness of names. But, indeed, I have only heard the single-drachma
course, and therefore, I do not know the truth about such matters; I
will, however, gladly assist you and Cratylus in the investigation of
them. When he declares that your name is not really Hermogenes, I
suspect that he is only making fun of you;—he means to say that you are
no true son of Hermes, because you are always looking after a fortune
and never in luck. But, as I was saying, there is a good deal of
difficulty in this sort of knowledge, and therefore we had better leave
the question open until we have heard both sides.
HERMOGENES: I have often talked over this matter, both with Cratylus
and others, and cannot convince myself that there is any principle of
correctness in names other than convention and agreement; any name
which you give, in my opinion, is the right one, and if you change that
and give another, the new name is as correct as the old—we frequently
change the names of our slaves, and the newly-imposed name is as good
as the old: for there is no name given to anything by nature; all is
convention and habit of the users;—such is my view. But if I am
mistaken I shall be happy to hear and learn of Cratylus, or of any one
else.
SOCRATES: I dare say that you may be right, Hermogenes: let us
see;—Your meaning is, that the name of each thing is only that which
anybody agrees to call it?
HERMOGENES: That is my notion.
SOCRATES: Whether the giver of the name be an individual or a city?
HERMOGENES: Yes.