Since it is not a part in relation to itself it cannot be related to itself as whole to part? It cannot. But is the one other than one? No. And therefore not other than itself? Certainly not. If then it be neither other, nor a whole, nor a part in relation to itself, must it not be the same with itself? Certainly. But then, again, a thing which is in another place from 'itself,' if this 'itself' remains in the same place with itself, must be other than 'itself,' for it will be in another place? True. Then the one has been shown to be at once in itself and in another? Yes. Thus, then, as appears, the one will be other than itself? True. Well, then, if anything be other than anything, will it not be other than that which is other? Certainly. And will not all things that are not one, be other than the one, and the one other than the not-one? Of course. Then the one will be other than the others? True. But, consider:--Are not the absolute same, and the absolute other, opposites to one another? Of course. Then will the same ever be in the other, or the other in the same? They will not. If then the other is never in the same, there is nothing in which the other is during any space of time; for during that space of time, however small, the other would be in the same. Is not that true? Yes. And since the other is never in the same, it can never be in anything that is. True. Then the other will never be either in the not-one, or in the one? Certainly not. Then not by reason of otherness is the one other than the not-one, or the not-one other than the one. No. Nor by reason of themselves will they be other than one another, if not partaking of the other. How can they be? But if they are not other, either by reason of themselves or of the other, will they not altogether escape being other than one another? They will. Again, the not-one cannot partake of the one; otherwise it would not have been not-one, but would have been in some way one. True. Nor can the not-one be number; for having number, it would not have been not-one at all. It would not. Again, is the not-one part of the one; or rather, would it not in that case partake of the one? It would. If then, in every point of view, the one and the not-one are distinct, then neither is the one part or whole of the not-one, nor is the not-one part or whole of the one? No. But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one another, nor other than one another, will be the same with one another:--so we said? Yes. Then shall we say that the one, being in this relation to the not-one, is the same with it? Let us say so. Then it is the same with itself and the others, and also other than itself and the others. That appears to be the inference. And it will also be like and unlike itself and the others? Perhaps. Since the one was shown to be other than the others, the others will also be other than the one. Yes.